Abstract-We study the problem of designing revenuemaximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible consumers. In our model, each consumer is interested in a subset of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one good from this set. A consumer's flexibility set and its utility from consuming a good from its flexibility set are its private information. We focus on the case of nested flexibility sets-each consumer's flexibility set can be one of the k nested sets. We provide several examples where such nested flexibility sets may arise. We characterize the allocation rule for an incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-maximizing auction in terms of solutions to integer programs. The corresponding payment rule is described by an integral equation. We then leverage the nestedness of flexibility sets to simplify the optimal auction and provide a complete characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple thresholds.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE problem of allocating limited resources among multiple users arises frequently in a wide array of applications ranging from communication networks to transportation and power systems. In many such applications, the users are selfish agents with private information about their preferences and constraints. Finding a desirable allocation of resources would typically require at least a partial knowledge of users' private preferences and constraints. The users, however, can behave strategically in revealing their private information to benefit themselves at the expense of other users and/or the owner of the resources being allocated. Thus, the presence of strategic users with private information creates two key challenges for the resource allocation problem: 1) the allocation needs to be based on the information revealed by the users; and 2) the allocation procedure must anticipate users' strategic behavior in the revelation of their private information. The economic theory of mechanism design provides a framework for addressing such resource allocation problems.
Auctions provide one of the simplest settings of a mechanism design problem. An auctioneer/mechanism designer would typically ask for bids from potential customers, and allocate resources and charge payments as a function of the received bids. Customers with private information about their utilities can be strategic about what bids they submit. The auction design problem is to find suitable allocation and payment functions, which map the customers' bids to allocations and payments, so that the auctioneer can achieve some desired objective. Typically, the auctioneer's objectives are either maximization of its revenue or maximization of social welfare.
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenuemaximizing auctions for multiple goods and flexible consumers. Consumer flexibility about goods can arise in different scenarios. In demand response programs of electric utilities, some consumers may be flexible about when and at what rate they receive power. In airline/hotel reservation settings, customers may be flexible about their travel dates. The seller of these goods/services should be able to take this flexibility into account to improve its profits. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a flexibility set that describes the subset of goods the consumer is equally interested in. Each consumer wants to consume one good from its flexibility set. The flexibility set of a consumer and the utility it gets from consuming a good from its flexibility set are both its private information.
We focus on the case of nested flexibility sets-each consumer's flexibility set can be one of the k sets, B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B k , which are nested in the following way:
If consumers' flexibility sets are truthfully revealed to the auctioneer, the nestedness in (1) allows the auctioneer to compare consumer flexibility and say whether a given consumer is more, less, or equally flexible as another consumer.
A. Examples of Nested Flexibility
There are several markets where consumer flexibility resembles the nested pattern in (1) . For example, consider flexible electricity consumers that need one unit of energy within a certain deadline [1] . Let B τ denote the set of energy units available for delivery in the interval
A consumer who needs one unit of energy with a deadline of two can be seen as having B 2 as its flexibility set, that is, it needs one good from B 2 . A similar flexibility model appears in auctions with deadline-based goods such as airline ticket auctions where different customers may have different departure deadlines.
As another example, consider electricity consumers that need to receive a fixed amount of energy within a fixed time interval while having certain constraints on the rate at which they can receive energy. Suppose each consumer needs to receive one unit of energy within the time interval [0, T ] but some consumers need energy at a constant rate, whereas others can tolerate variable rates. Let B 1 be the set of energy units that the energy provider can supply at a constant rate over the interval [0, T ] and B 2 be the set of all energy units that can be supplied over the interval [0, T ]. We thus have consumers whose flexibility sets are either B 1 or B 2 with B 1 ⊂ B 2 .
Another example of consumer flexibility comes from auctionbased spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks [2] - [4] where a primary spectrum owner has multiple frequency bands with different bandwidths. These bands can be allocated to secondary users who need a certain minimum amount of bandwidth. Suppose the primary owner has frequency bands of widths w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k with w 1 < w 2 < · · · < w k . Let W i , i = 1, 2, . . . , k, denote the set of frequency bands of width w i that are available for allocation to secondary users. Define
. . , k, as the set of frequency bands of width greater than or equal to w k −i+1 . We thus have
A secondary user that needs one frequency band of width at least w i can be interpreted as having B k −i+1 as its flexibility set.
Consider next auction-based content delivery in wireless information centric networks [5] where multiple content providers compete for limited cache storage resources provided by a wireless access point (WAP) in a given region for a certain time period. Suppose the WAP has k cache servers with storage capacities c 1 < c 2 < · · · < c k . Assume that one cache server can serve at most one content provider at a time. Let B i be the set of cache servers with capacity greater than or equal to c k −i+1 . Clearly the sets B i , i = 1, . . . , k, are nested. A content provider who needs a cache of storage capacity at least c k −i+1 has the flexibility set B i .
B. Comparison With the Prior Literature
The problem of designing auctions has been investigated under many different setups in the prior literature and can be broadly categorized on the basis of the following: 1) the problem objective (revenue or social welfare maximization); 2) the nature of supply (single unit or multiple units, identical or nonidentical goods); 3) the nature of demand (unit demand, demand for bundles, etc.); and 4) the nature of private information (one-dimensional (1-D) or multidimensional). Numerous works have addressed social welfare maximizing or efficient auctions, the most well known of these being the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism [6] - [8] . Efficient auctions have also been extensively studied in the context of combinatorial auctions ( [9] , [10, Ch. 8] , and [11, Ch. 11] ). Under some scenarios, the problem of exactly maximizing social welfare may not be tractable. Some works such as in [12] and [13] have thus focused on approximate social welfare maximizing auctions. Our focus in this paper, however, is on revenue-maximizing auctions. In the context of revenue-maximizing auctions, we can categorize the relevant literature as follows.
1) Multiunit Auctions With Identical Goods:
This strand of literature has focused on revenue-maximizing auctions in settings where the seller has a number of identical goods and wants to allocate them among several consumers who may demand one or multiple units. In his seminal paper [14] , Myerson derived fundamental results for the single-unit revenue-maximizing auction. In sequel, several works studied revenue-maximizing multiunit auctions with identical goods under various assumptions about the consumers' utility functional forms and private information structure. The setups in [15] and [16] , for instance, include the problem of auctioning multiple identical goods among consumers with unit demand and private valuations. Malakhov and Vohra [17] considered the auction of multiple identical goods to consumers with limited capacities for the number of goods they can consume.
A key feature of these models is that all goods are perceived to be identical by all consumers. Thus, consumers care only about the number of goods they receive and not about the identities of the goods received. In contrast, consumers in our model differentiate between goods according to their flexibility sets. For example, a consumer with flexibility set B 1 differentiates between goods in B 1 (which give it a positive utility) and goods not in B 1 (which give no utility), whereas a consumer with a different flexibility set would view goods differently. In other words, the distinction between goods is made subjectively by each consumer based on its flexibility set.
2) Combinatorial Auctions:
The problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions has also been investigated in the context of combinatorial auctions [18, Sec. 5.2] . When the seller has multiple heterogeneous items to auction, consumers may have different utilities for different subsets of items due to complementarities and substitution effects. Combinatorial auctions provide a framework where consumers can place bids on various combinations/bundles of goods. Some key setups explored under this umbrella are as follows. a) Auctions with two nonidentical goods: Armstrong [19] studied revenue-maximizing auction for the case where the seller wants to sell two nonidentical goods to several consumers. Each consumer can receive one or both of the goods and has a pair of valuations, one for each of the two goods. The valuations are drawn from binary sets and are independent across the consumers. Avery and Hendershott [20] considered a similar setup as in Armstrong [19] with a single identifiable consumer who may wish to buy both objects and a number of other consumers who wish to buy only one or the other of the two objects. Two key features that differentiate these setups from our model are as follows: 1) in both these setups, one or more consumers can consume more than one good, whereas in our model each consumer can consume at most one good, and 2) the number of goods in our model is not restricted to be two. b) Auctions with single-minded consumers: Some recent works have considered an extreme case of complementarity among goods in multiunit auctions by imposing the assumption of having single-minded consumers. A singleminded consumer is interested in getting all goods from a certain subset of goods. This is in clear contrast to our setup where each consumer wants to get one good from its flexibility set.
Ledyard [21] characterized a revenue-maximizing dominant strategy auction for single-minded consumers where each consumer's desired bundle is known to the seller and a consumer's valuation constitutes its 1-D private information. Unlike the model in [21] , both valuation and flexibility set are a consumer's private information in our model. Abhishek and Hajek [22] [18] provide an optimization problem (in fact, a linear program) whose solution (if it exists) gives a payment rule that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality (IR) constraints. Eventually, after linear programs corresponding to all possible choices of the allocation rule are solved, the allocation and payment rules that yield the highest revenue are declared as the revenuemaximizing mechanism. As pointed out in [18, Sec. 5.2] , this approach is computationally very demanding because the number of possible allocation rules can be very large and no closed-form solutions are available in general.
Our model can be seen as a special case of the general framework of [18] . A consumer with flexibility set B i and valuation α can be viewed as having a value function of the form
In Section V, we show that under the assumption of nested flexibility sets, we can find the optimal auction in a much more straightforward and computationally simpler way than the one described in [18] . In particular, unlike the case in [18, Sec. 5.2], we do not need to solve a separate optimization problem for every possible allocation rule, which results in a significant reduction in the computational cost. It should also be noted that a consumer's private information (its value function) in [18] is drawn from a finite set, whereas the valuation in our model is a continuous variable. Remark 1: Consumers in our model want one good from their flexibility sets. This model can be viewed as a special case of the models in [25] and [26] where a number of (potentially nonidentical) goods are to be allocated among several consumers and each consumer is interested in receiving at most one good. Unlike our objective of revenue maximization, the objective in [25] and [26] is to find minimal competitive prices and equilibrium assignments to clear the market.
Remark 2:
The model and results in [1] are fundamentally different from those in this paper. In particular, Bitar and Xu [1] deal with a continuum of consumers. This is crucial because it implies that a single consumer cannot influence the "aggregate demand bundle" (as defined in [1] ) and hence the prices. This is in stark contrast to this paper (and most auction design problems) with finitely many consumers where each consumer can influence the prices through its reports/bids. This means that each individual consumer can strategically manipulate its report to influence allocation and prices in our problem, whereas it has no effect on prices in [1] . This, we believe, makes this paper conceptually very different from [1] .
C. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the problem formulation and the mechanism setup in Section II. In Section III, we characterize incentive compatibility and IR constraints for the mechanism. We show that the optimal allocation is the solution to an integer program in Section IV. In Section V, we simplify the optimal allocation and payments and characterize them in terms of simple thresholds. We summarize our findings and briefly point out potential extensions to the current framework in Section VI .
D. Notations

{0, 1}
N ×M denotes the space of N × M dimensional matrices with entries that are either 0 or 1. Z + is the set of nonnegative integers. For a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A. x + is the positive part of the real number x, that is, x + = max(x, 0). Vector inequalities are componentwise; that is, for two
The transpose of a vector u is denoted by u T . 1 {a≤b} denotes 1 if the inequality in the subscript is true and 0 otherwise. E denotes the expectation operator. For a random variable/random vector θ, E θ denotes that the expectation is with respect to the probability distribution of θ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a setup where an auctioneer has M goods and N potential customers. M = {1, 2, . . . , M} denotes the set of goods and N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the set of potential customers. Customer i, i ∈ N , has a flexibility set φ i ⊂ M, which represents the set of goods the customer is equally interested in. Customer i can consume at most one good from its flexibility set φ i . We assume that the flexibility set of each customer can be one of the k nested sets. That is, we have k nested subsets of the set of goods
and An allocation of the goods among the customers can be described by an N × M dimensional matrix A with the entry A(i, j) = 1 if customer i gets good j and A(i, j) = 0 otherwise. The matrix A is called an allocation matrix. We assume that the goods are indexed such that the first |B l | goods belong to B l , for l = 1, . . . , k.
We require that each of the M available goods be allocated to at most one customer and that each customer receives at most one good. This implies that
A binary matrix A that satisfies these two constraints is called a feasible allocation matrix. Let S ⊂ {0, 1}
N ×M denote the set of all feasible allocation matrices. That is
Given an allocation matrix A and a payment t i charged to customer i, the net utility for this customer is
A. Mechanism
We consider direct mechanisms where, for each i ∈ N , customer i reports a valuation from the set Θ i and a flexibility level from the set {1, 2, . . . , k} to the auctioneer. Customers can misreport their valuations as well as their flexibility levels. A mechanism consists of an allocation rule q and a payment rule t. The allocation rule q is a mapping from the type profile space Θ × {1, 2, . . . , k} N to the set of feasible allocation matrices S. The payment rule t is a mapping from Θ × {1, 2, . . . , k} N to R N with the ith component t i being the payment charged to customer i.
Consider a mechanism (q, t) and suppose customers report valuations r := (r 1 , . . . , r N ) and flexibility levels c := (c 1 , . . . , c N ). 3 The mechanism then results in an allocation matrix q(r, c) and payments t(r, c). Let a(b i ) be a 1 × M dimensional vector whose first |B b i | entries are 1 and the rest are 0. In 1 θ m in i is assumed to be nonnegative. 2 We assume that
3 Customers may not report their valuations and/or flexibility levels truthfully, so r i and c i may be different from θ i and b i , respectively. other words, the j entry of a(b i ) is given as
Customer i's utility function can then be written in terms of its true valuation θ i , true flexibility level b i , the reported valuations r, and the reported flexibility levels c as
where q i (r, c) is the ith row of the allocation matrix q(r, c).
B. Incentive Compatibility and IR
The auctioneer's objective is to find a mechanism that maximizes its expected revenue while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and IR constraints. We describe these constraints below.
In a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, truthful reporting of private information (valuations and flexibility levels in our setup) constitutes an equilibrium of the Bayesian game induced by the mechanism. In other words, each customer would prefer to report its true valuation and flexibility level provided that all other customers have adopted truth-telling strategy. Bayesian incentive compatibility can be described by the following constraint:
Equation (8) states that the expected utility of customer i with type (θ i , b i ) if it reports its type truthfully is greater than or equal to its utility if it reports some other type (r i , c i ). IR constraint implies that each customer's expected utility at the truthful reporting equilibrium is nonnegative. This can be expressed as follows:
The expected revenue under a BIC and IR mechanism is
} when all customers adopt the truthful strategy. The auction design problem can now be formulated as
C. Key Assumptions
We make two assumptions for the auction design problem. First, we assume that the allocation rule q does not give a customer any good that is outside its reported flexibility set. This can be formalized as follows. The above assumption simply means that the mechanism respects the customers' reported flexibility constraints. We further assume that customers cannot overreport their flexibility level. The above assumption can be justified by noting that customers gain no utility from getting a good outside their true flexibility set and may in fact suffer a significant disutility if allocated a good outside their true flexibility set. For instance, consider the example of rate-constrained energy delivery in electricity markets that is discussed in Section I-A. While some consumers may be able to tolerate variable rates of energy delivery and are thus considered to be more flexible, other (less flexible) consumers may need to receive energy at a constant rate as their devices could be damaged otherwise. It is thus reasonable to assume that in this case, the consumers will not report higher flexibility level as it could cause significant disutility to them. More generally, customers may reasonably restrict themselves to underreporting or truthfully reporting their flexibility level if goods outside their flexibility set may be damaging or cause large disutility to them. Assumption 2 implies that the BIC constraint in (8) Consider a mechanism for this case that operates as follows. a) Each customer reports a valuation and a flexibility level. b) If customer i has the highest valuation (assume that ties are resolved randomly), the mechanism allocates a good to customer i from its reported flexibility set and charges it the second highest reported valuation. c) The other customer is allocated a good from its flexibility set if such a good is available and it is charged a reserve price of 0.5. Suppose that customer 1 reports its type truthfully and that customer 2's true type is (θ 2 = 2, b 2 = 2). If customer 2 also reports its type truthfully, it will obtain a good at a price of 1 (the second highest reported valuation) resulting in a net utility of 2 − 1 = 1. On the other hand, if it misreports its type as (0.5, 2), it will obtain a good at a price of 0.5 resulting in a net utility of 1.5. 2) Consider the same setup as above but with the following mechanism. a) Each customer reports a valuation and a flexibility level. b) If customer i has the highest valuation (assume that ties are resolved randomly), the mechanism allocates a good to customer i from its reported flexibility set. Customer i is charged the reported valuation of the other customer if the two reported the same flexibility level, otherwise it pays a reserve price of 0.5. c) The other customer is allocated a good from its flexibility set if such a good is available and it is charged a reserve price of 0.5. Suppose that customer 1 reports its type truthfully and that customer 2's true type is (θ 2 = 2, b 2 = 2). If customer 2 also reports its type truthfully, it will obtain a good at a price of 1 resulting in a net utility of 2 − 1 = 1. On the other hand, if it misreports its type as (2, 1), it will obtain a good at a price of 0.5 resulting in a net utility of 1.5. Thus, in both the above-mentioned examples, the mechanism described is not incentive compatible.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF BIC AND IR MECHANISMS
Suppose all customers other than i report their valuations and flexibility levels truthfully. We can then define customer i's expected allocation and payment under the mechanism (q, t) when it reports r i ∈ Θ i , c i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} as follows:
We can now rewrite (8) and (9) in terms of the interim quantities defined in (10) and (11) . The BIC constraint for misreporting valuations and flexibility levels becomes
The IR constraint is rewritten as follows:
A. 1-D Misreports
The BIC constraint in (12) captures all possible ways in which a customer may misreport its private information. It includes the following two special subclasses of constraints.
1) BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation
2) BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility level
The following result relates the above constraints for "1-D" misreports to the general BIC constraint in (12) .
Lemma 1: The BIC constraint for misreporting both valuation and flexibility level implies and is implied by the BIC constraints for misreporting only valuation and misreporting only flexibility level. That is, (12) holds if and only if (14) and (15) hold.
Proof: See Appendix A. Lemma 1 allows us to replace the general BIC constraint for 2-D misreports by the simpler 1-D BIC constraints given in (14) and (15) . The auction design problem now becomes
B. Alternative Characterization of (13)-(15)
We will now derive alternative characterizations of the constraints (13)-(15) that will be helpful for finding the optimal mechanism.
Lemma 2: A mechanism (q, t) satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation [as given in (14) 
for all r i , b i .
Proof: See Appendix B. Lemma 3: Suppose the mechanism (q, t) satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation [as given in (14)]. Then, it satisfies the IR constraint (13) 
if and only if for all
Proof: Clearly (13) implies (17) . The converse follows from Lemma 2 by noting that
and that the right-hand side above is nonpositive due to (17) .
Using the above two lemmas, we derive a sufficient condition for the mechanism to satisfy the BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility level.
Lemma 4: Suppose the mechanism (q, t) is individually rational and satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation [as given in (14)]. Then, the mechanism (q, t) satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility level if the following are true:
IV. REVENUE-MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
We can now use the results of Section III to simplify the objective of the auction design problem. We define 
Then, (q, t) is an optimal mechanism. Proof: See Appendix D. In order to simplify the maximization problem in (19), we assume that the virtual types 
Further, b i > b i and θ i ≥ θ i imply
Assumption 3: We assume that the probability density functions f i (·, ·) satisfy the generalized monotone hazard rate condition for all i ∈ N .
Remark 3: The above condition can be viewed as a generalization of the increasing hazard rate condition [27, Ch. 2] and is similar to the condition about monotonicity of virtual valuations described in [28] for multidimensional private types. To get further insights into the implications of Assumption 3, consider two possible types of customer i with flexibility levels b C ≥ b D . Let X C and X D be random variables that are distributed according to the corresponding conditional probability density functions f i (.|b C ) and f i (.|b D ), respectively. For a realization α of X C and X D , Assumption 3 implies
In The following theorem characterizes the optimal mechanism under the above-mentioned assumptions.
Theorem 1: Consider the allocation and tax functions (q * , t * ) defined in the following:
where A i is the ith row of matrix A
is a revenue-maximizing BIC and individually rational mechanism.
Proof: See Appendix E. The optimal allocation matrix q * (θ, b) given in (23) is the solution of an integer program and hence computationally hard to obtain. Moreover, each type profile (θ, b) ∈ Θ × {1, 2, . . . , k} N requires the solution of a different integer program. Similarly, the characterization of payments given by (24) is not very useful from a computational viewpoint as it requires the solution of a continuum of integer programs. In the next section, we leverage the nested structure imposed on customers' flexibility sets to simplify the optimal mechanism.
V. CANDIDATE REVENUE MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
Based on their true flexibility sets, we can divide the customers into k classes: C l is the set of customers with flexibility set B l . Clearly, N = k i=1 C i and for i = j, C i ∩ C j = ∅. We define
We also define vectors n and m as
Vector n is referred to as the demand profile and vector m is referred to as the supply profile.
A. Supply Adequacy Problem
Before describing the optimal mechanism, we will need to answer the following two questions.
1) Given a supply profile m and a demand profile n, can the available goods be used to satisfy all customers? In other words, does there exist an allocation matrix A ∈ {0, 1} N ×M such that
The above conditions on A ensure that each customer gets a good from its flexibility set and that a good is not allocated to multiple customers. If such an allocation matrix exists, we say that the supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile n. 2) If the supply profile m is not adequate for the demand profile n, we have to remove some customers from the demand profile to achieve adequacy. What is the minimum number of customers that must be removed to achieve adequacy? Borrowing ideas from [30] , we provide answers to the above questions in Lemmas 6 and 7.
Lemma 6: We say that n ≺ w m if the following k inequalities hold:
1) The supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile n if and only if n ≺ w m. 2) If the supply profile is adequate for the demand profile, a feasible allocation is obtained as follows:
Arrange customers in order of increasing flexibility level; then, the ith customer in this order gets the ith good. Proof: The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted due to space limitations. For part (b), recall that the goods are indexed such that the first |B l | goods belong to B l , for l = 1, . . . , k.
If the supply profile m is not adequate, we have to remove some customers from the demand profile. Consider a demand profileñ ≤ n obtained by removing some customers. This new demand profile will result in adequacy if and only ifñ ≺ w m. Thus, the minimum number of customers to be removed to achieve adequacy is given by the following optimization problem: (29) n in the above optimization problem is a vector of nonnegative integers. The above integer program has a simple solution described in the following lemma. Proof: See Appendix F.
B. Optimal Allocation
We can now use the results of Section V-A to find the optimal allocation for a given type profile (θ, b). Recall from Theorem 1 that the optimal allocation is given as
We describe the optimal allocation in the following steps. 
Let n
. . , r * k as in Lemma 7 by replacing n i with n
1 customers with the lowest virtual valuations are removed from consideration. 5 The set of remaining customers in L 1 is denoted by N 1 . 3) We now proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given the set
Remove r * i customers with lowest virtual valuations from L i . The set of remaining customers in L i is now defined as N i . 4) After the kth iteration, all customers in N k are allocated a good from their respective flexibility sets. 5 Ties are resolved randomly. For continuous valuations, ties happen with zero probability and therefore the allocation rule for ties does not affect expected revenue. 
Define w
Define
Keep the consumers in N i , remove the ones in
i ←− i + 1 11: All customers in N k are allocated goods in order of increasing flexibility level (as per Lemma 6).
The iterative procedure described above is outlined in Algorithm 1.
The optimality of the above allocation can be intuitively explained as follows: First, it is clear that an optimal allocation should not give any goods to customers with nonpositive virtual valuations. Among the remaining customers of class C 1 , at least r * 1 customers cannot be served (see Lemma 7 with n i replaced by n + i for all i). It is easy to see that the r * 1 customers with the lowest virtual valuations should be removed. This argument can be used iteratively. At the ith iteration, at least r * i additional customers need to be removed from the first i classes otherwise the ith adequacy inequality would be violated. An optimal allocation should remove r * i customers with lowest virtual valuations. After the kth iteration, exactly k i=1 r * i customers have been removed and the remaining customers' demand profile satisfies all the adequacy inequalities.
The above optimal allocation procedure can also be described using thresholds. Define Thus
C. Payment Functions
We can now use the optimal allocation rule described in Section V-B to simplify customers' payment functions. From (24) , the optimal payment function for customer l in flexibility class C i has the following form:
The optimal allocation and payments can thus be computed through the straightforward threshold-based procedure constructed in Sections V-B and V-C. By using the nested structure of the flexibility sets, this procedure obviates the need to solve the computationally hard integer program formulated in Theorem 1.
Remark 5: It should be noted that (34)-(37) imply that the mechanism (q * , t * ) proposed in Sections V-B and V-C is ex post individually rational, that is, at the truthful equilibrium, the mechanism guarantees that each consumer gets nonnegative utility for every realization of consumers' types. In particular, under (q * , t * ) a consumer who receives no good does not pay anything.
D. Computational Complexity of the Algorithm
To get a better idea of the computational complexity of the solution approach developed in Sections V-B and V-C, we take a closer look at the key steps.
The allocation procedure requires the recursive evaluation of the quantities r * 1 , . . . , r * k as per the closed-form solutions given in step 3 of Algorithm 1. As is evident from these equations, computation of r * 1 , . . . , r * k is straightforward and needs nothing more than addition, subtraction, and comparison with 0.
Once these quantities are obtained, the allocation rule is given by an iterative procedure that consists of k iterations. At each iteration, the following steps are taken.
1) Sort the virtual valuations in the set L i (sorting). As can be seen from the above steps, the only real computation involved in each iteration is sorting, 6 which is known to be computationally efficient.
The allocation and payment procedure does require computing virtual valuations from the reported types and using the inverse mapping . However, we believe these mappings can be precomputed with appropriate discretization and stored in a lookup table to be used when needed. The necessity of computing virtual valuations from types and vice versa is a common feature of many mechanism design problems and not unique to our auction.
Remark 6: Suppose that θ l and b l are independent random variables for all l ∈ N . In this case, the virtual valuation for customer l will take the following form:
If we further assume that for all l ∈ N , θ l is distributed over the set [θ min , θ max ] according to the same probability density function f , then the thresholds θ 
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible customers. In our model, each customer is interested in a subset of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one good from this set. A customer's flexibility set and its utility from consuming a good from its flexibility set are its private information. We characterized the allocation rule for an incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-maximizing auction in terms 6 Comparison-based sorting algorithms have the worst case complexity of O(n log n) on n inputs [ of solutions to integer programs. The corresponding payment rule was described by an integral equation. We then leveraged the nestedness of flexibility sets to simplify the optimal auction and provided a complete characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple thresholds. A possible extension of our framework is the case where customers may demand more than one good from their flexibility sets. It would also be interesting to study this auction problem under dynamic settings where the set of customers and/or goods can change over time. In such a setting, customers may have richer private information that includes their valuation, flexibility sets, and their temporal presence information. Moreover, dynamic models can incorporate supply uncertainties to capture scenarios where the seller relies on uncertain and time-varying resources (such as renewable energy) to serve its customers. The auction mechanism then needs to make sequential decisions based on information revealed at or before the current time. Investigating these dynamic mechanism design problems will be a key task for future research.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Clearly (12) implies (14) and (15) . To prove the converse, consider flexibility levels c i and b i with c i ≤ b i . From (15), we have
Consider θ i , r i ∈ Θ i . From (14), we have
Adding the inequalities in (40) and (41), we obtain
Because of Assumption 1, we have a(c i )
. Equation (42) can then be written as
which is the 2-D BIC constraint of (12) . 
Its expected utility is
We can then use (16) to rewrite customer i's expected utility as
We now need to show that
. . , k}, to conclude Bayesian incentive compatibility in valuation for customer i. We use the form given in (16) to write
It is straightforward to verify that because of a(b i )Q T i (r i , b i ) being nondecreasing in r i , the expression in (46) is nonnegative for both r i < θ i and r i > θ i . Hence
which establishes Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism (q, t) in valuation for customer i. Necessity: Suppose (q, t) is BIC in valuation. Consider two candidate valuations x, y ∈ Θ i , x < y that customer i might have. First, assume (x, b i ) is customer i's true type. Then, BIC in valuation implies
(48) Now, consider (y, b i ) to be the true type. BIC in valuation gives
(49) Adding (48) and (49) and simplifying gives
as customer i's expected utility when its valuation is θ i and its flexibility level is b i and it adopts truth-telling strategy
Using Bayesian incentive compatibility in valuation (51) can be written as 
Using (16) The total expected revenue can be written as
For a mechanism that is individually rational and BIC, we can use the result in Lemma 2 to plug in the expression for T i (θ i , b i ).
After some simplifications, we obtain that
We can now rewrite the auctioneer's total expected revenue in (57) as follows: 
